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Abstract: Gwadar port is a deep-sea port that lies at the 
southwestern coast of the Balochistan province. Since 2002, it has 
been given quite some attention; the government realized its 
potential of becoming a major hub port of the region, given its 
proximity to the Strait of Hormuz, a sea passage through which a 
fifth of the world’s oil transit occurs. MOUs have been signed 
and commitments made in excess of a billion U.S. dollars for 
projects at the port, including economic and industrial zones, an 
international airport, railway and road networks, and civic centers, 
among others. A few other multibillionaire projects in the 
province have been announced in connection with the port. 
Gwadar is Balochistan’s biggest and the province’s first 
international project at this scale. 
However, Gwadar is subject to mixed implications; whereas 
several development initiatives have gone underway to exploit the 
port’s potential, there have been numerous conflicts, obstacles 
and delays and a serious lack of attention paid towards the port. 
China’s focus has been at the center of the development of 
Gwadar. With global trade growing, as well as China and 
Pakistan’s international and bilateral trade soaring1, Gwadar 
would be one more doorway for these two countries and the rest 
of the world. It could also be enrolled in China’s vast 
communication network – the String of Pearls. 
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3. INTRODUCTION 
Trade has always been one of the primary pillars of remuneration since prehistoric times. Since 
the beginning of communication, man felt the need to establish balance to the coexistence of 
individuals in a society, and exchange of goods and services began, one for another. 
Trading, or “Barter” of goods and services, as it is referred to for olden times, laid the 
foundation of the modern economic ecosystems and currencies and other legal tenders as we 
now know them. Peter Watson, in his book on history, hints to the existence of long-distance 
trade from circa 150,000 years ago (Watson 2006). 
Like a chain that is as strong as its links, trade is as sound as the medium and methods used. 
Naturally, these are mainly land, sea and air transport. One could argue that electronic, digital, 
and, for that matter, electromagnetic waves are other media. Nonetheless, they are subgenre of 
the land (landlines, hard-wiring, cabling, networking), air (wireless, radio waves etc.) or sea 
(international fiber-optic lines) media. 
 
 
Figure I: Gwadar’s Location – Global Map2 
Source: Google Maps 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
2 Figure obtained from http://maps.google.com/. 
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Sea trade commenced when societies felt the need to travel beyond the boundaries of dry land, 
and to discover new avenues and greener pastures. Naturally, establishments near coasts gave 
birth to modern-day ports. The seas are one of primary ways to connect to continents otherwise 
not connected by land. Sea routes can be linked with land routes for the drier parts of the region 
to shorten distances and save time and costs. An example, in our very case is China, which would 
have rather easier access to the Central Asian states as well as the Persian Gulf through 
Pakistan’s ports. 
Economic integration has continuously been addressed in recent years. In the last century, the 
world has shrunk ever close, thanks to the globalization phenomena, which has aimed to shorten 
distances and obstacles and fused the world in as compact and tightly integrated universe as 
possible. Such movement has given birth to the likes of Free Trade and the WTO. 
For the last few years, such integration has also been sparking in this region of Asia. In this very 
document, particular consideration has been placed on the integration of China, Central Asia and 
the Middle East, including Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
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4. OBJECTIVE OF THIS PAPER 
4.1. Background 
Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan with respect to occupied area, spanning over 
347,000 square kilometers, almost 44% land of the country. Sui, which accounts to a quarter of 
the total natural gas production, is also in Balochistan. Balochistan is also home to copious 
natural resources, the province with the most abundant amounts of them in the country. 
Unfortunately, Balochistan is also the most overlooked and compromised province, and it has 
always been a cry of the Baloch people; they have complained of Pakistan’s unjust exploitation of 
the province’s resources, citing several times that they are not paid their proper due of their 
contribution. This has historically raised several issues and conflicts in the area, to extents of 
even military operations against influential tribal leaders like Akbar Bugti, one of the most 
famous ones, who was killed by the military’s hand. 
There have hardly been instances of development in the province, and it has been decades since 
a project as huge as Gwadar appeared on the map. 
4.2. Research Question 
Much has been said and written about the development of a deep seaport at Gwadar. The latest 
pronouncement in this regard has come from then-Chief Executive, General Pervez Musharraf, 
who remarked that he “failed to understand why such an important project had not been 
implemented so far” (Hashmi 1999). 
Has Gwadar realizing its true potential? Did the project that commenced in 2002 as the country’s 
most international project in years get its due? Has Gwadar achieved the expected results? These 
questions integrate into one more comprehensive question: 
“Is Gwadar an Economic Haven for Balochistan and Pakistan?” 
 
The objective of this paper is to address the above statement, and in doing so, the paper will 
ponder upon all the planned developments and economic expectations, their eventual execution, 
and the reasons for success (or failure) of the economic viability of the port project. Gwadar’s 
realization is an important turning point for the economy of Balochistan in particular, and 
Pakistan in general. This paper will analyze how far the economic benefits of Gwadar have been 
obtained, and where efforts and policy-making are lacking, if any. As a result, the paper would 
make important recommendations to optimize the economic interests in Gwadar. 
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5. GWADAR 
5.1. Gwadar: A Few Insights 
Gwadar is a coastal city at the southwestern region of the Balochistan (or “Makran”) province. 
The indigenous people of the province have historically been anglers and anciently known as 
“Mahi Khoran” by the Persians, coining the modern term “Makran”. 
Inhabitation of Gwadar has been ancient, as early as the Bronze Age where settlements existed 
around some of the area's oases. Being captured by the Persians and the Greeks before them, the 
region came under indigenous rule in around about 303 BCE. 
The Arab-Muslim army of Muhammad bin Qasim captured Gwadar in 711 and later the area was 
contested by various powers including the Mughals (from the east) and the Safavids (from the 
west) over the course of the next millennium. Gwadar was captured by the Portuguese in 1581, 
which was later then followed by almost two centuries of local rule by various Baloch tribes. 
Then in 1783, Taimur Sultan ruled over Gwadar. The Khan of Kalat was the previous ruler of 
Muscat, who subsequently retook Muscat, and reestablished his rule by appointing a governor. 
Records indicate that Pakistan paid Oman anywhere between US$ 70 to 140 Million3 for Gwadar 
in 1958. Gwadar officially became part of Pakistan on eighth of December that year. It was then 
a small and underdeveloped fishing village with a population of a few thousands. 
Pakistan inducted Gwadar into Balochistan on 1 July 1977. 
5.2. Gwadar: Location 
Gwadar is at the south-west of Balochistan province, which shares borders with Afghanistan and 
Iran to the west. Gwadar is about a 100 kilometers from the Iranian border, and its proximity to 
the Persian Gulf is significant, since about 400 km away is the Strait of Hormuz through which 
about 20% of the world's oil (almost 17 million barrels) passes per day  (Administration 2011). 
Considered internationally as a smaller port (Port 2012), it is about 500 kilometers west of 
Karachi. Once the road networks are complete, China would connect to Gwadar through the 
Indus Highway. 
Gwadar is on a natural hammerhead-shaped peninsula forming two almost perfect but naturally 
curved semicircular bays on either side, namely the Gwadar West Bay and Gwadar East Bay 
(Anwar 2011). It lies at the apex of the Arabian Sea and at the mouth of the Gulf of Oman. It is 
one of the three main seaports of Pakistan, the other two being the Karachi Port, and the Port 
Muhammad Bin Qasim. The warm-water deep-sea port was completed in 2007, is 14 meters (46 
ft.) deep, and has the capacity to handle the largest of cargo ships. The port would act as a trade 
hub and a transit for Chinese imports and shipments. 
By land, the port is to connect with the Indus Highway (N-55), which would in turn connect 
with the Karakoram Highway in the North, near the Pakistan-China border. This would give the 
                                            
3
 This figure is inflation adjusted of the US$ 3 Million paid to Oman. Some sources argue half of that amount was paid. 
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Chinese province of Xinjiang access to the Arabian Sea and pave way for the Great Asian 
Dragon to have access to trade with the Central Asian States and European countries alike. 
China and a few other central Asian countries are already working on road and railway networks 
to access the port (Gwadar News 2010). 
Gwadar is one of the few planned cities of Pakistan, developed from ground up based on 
predominantly a plan of an economic and trade hub for the region. 
The first cargo ship, the largest to port in Pakistan till-date, arrived on March 15, 2008 (Gwadar 
2008). The port of Gwadar was officially opened on 21 December that year when the first 
international ship (a carrier from Qatar carrying fertilizer) anchored there (Gwadar News 2010). 
 
 
Figure II: Gwadar’s Location – Close-up View4 
Source: Google Maps 
 
5.3. Gwadar: Importance 
The Baloch people have no history of economic development. The infrastructure there is 
severely lacking. Whatever available, like gas pipelines and other critical installations directly 
relevant to the few corresponding products, are vulnerable and subject to attacks and frequent 
disruptions. Gwadar is Baluchistan’s shot at coming out of feudalism and a primitive, caveman 
mindset. In fact, right now it is the only way to reintroduce the 6 million residents to the rest of 
the country and to the world, helping Baloch get rid of their bad spells of ignorance and 
                                            
4 Figure obtained from http://maps.google.com/. 
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violence. The development of Gwadar could stir other projects and initiatives in Balochistan in 
future, depending on of course, Gwadar’s outcome. 
Although several development plans and industrial and educational initiatives (Saleem Shahid 
2012) are making the news, hardly any are nearing any actual development (Recorder 2010). 
Gwadar is the only project that has been somewhat realized. 
Gwadar is the first infrastructure and technological development of the area in years, or probably 
even centuries. It is Balochistan’s first international scale project, and a huge investment spot, the 
major chunk of it being Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). It is equally a necessary representation 
and symbol of the Baloch people, a development that is of utter importance to their image to the 
nation and rest of the world. The rest of the landscape of the province contains no substantial 
establishments or infrastructural deployments of this level. 
Gwadar’s vicinity to the Oil-rich Gulf States is another potential for the area, for gas and oil 
reserve exploration and trade and others’ oil and gas transportation alike (Hashmi 1999). Dawn 
News (S. F.-e.-H. News 2008) cited that the Gwadar Port Authority “initially planned to cater 
100,000 containers, 300,000 tonnes of general cargo and half a million tonnes of food grains”. 
Gwadar is also rich in fisheries, being an angler’s bay for centuries, no less. The 600 km long 
coastal line has a potential to fish and crab exports and accompanying food-processing industries 
(Hashmi 1999). 
 
 
 
6. OUTLINE OF THE PAPER 
This paper would first throw light on the features and importance of Gwadar. The first section 
would bring forth the theoretical framework of the benefits of Gwadar, and the significance of 
the port along with applicable economic, infrastructural, and to an extent, military implications. 
It discusses the potential of the port, its uses and strategic and economic benefits to 
stakeholders. It also highlights parallel developments that are required, and would take place to 
support the project. It analyzes the role of the Pakistani government and China, the other 
primary beneficiary of the project, and emphasizes on the favorable developments and 
implications the port has. 
The second section highlights important developments and current scenario of the port, related 
developments along with information on competing ports in the region. The section also 
highlights other projects that are distantly related with the port project. 
The third section discusses actual performance of the port comparable with the expected 
benefits.  
The fourth section highlights why the performance has deviated from expectations, and what 
went right or wrong in Gwadar’s journey to prosperity. Internal conflicts play a more critical role 
than foreign influences. 
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The last section summarize the findings of the previous sections, condensing the whole paper 
and skewing the privileges the Gwadar port project had, along with the lack of performances it 
suffers from. This section then concludes the findings and formulates recommendations for all 
stakeholders of Gwadar to help bring the efforts vested in the port to fruition and suggest a plan 
of action. 
 
7. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
7.1. Data 
This paper is based predominantly on secondary data that has been collected through a variety of 
articles, including those published in business/economic journals, as well as several news 
sources, including digital ones. The idea for such a framework is provide the reader a better 
understanding of the topic. The research methodology revolves around study of previous papers 
on the subject. Various digital sources have been dug up to extract useful and relevant 
information, including journal articles, news, and web-articles etc. 
(M, P and A. 2009), in their book of business research methods maintain that there are several 
types of secondary data. The method used in this paper, categorized by that book, is referred to 
as documentary secondary data, and although is mainly used in studies and projects that use primary 
data sources, it can be used on its own with other data sources (M, P and A. 2009).  
Another reason for the method used is because the case of the Gwadar Port has some elements 
of a case study, one being done on a particular “area”.  As sighted by  (M, P and A. 2009) “… 
those research projects that make use of documentary secondary data often do so as part of within-company action 
research project or a case study of a particular organization…” 
It is added that to broaden the horizon of this paper, two individuals were interviewed, although 
in a completely informal fashion. Even though their opinions may not have significant effect, 
those opinions should not be undermined. 
7.2. Research Approach 
There are two different ways of approaching a research, namely the deductive approach or the 
inductive approach (M, P and A. 2009). Because of the character of the research in this paper, 
inductive research approach is implemented since this a qualitative study, whereas the deductive 
approach is directed towards quantitative studies. More importantly, the nature of the inductive 
approach is about formulating a theory, which is based on observations and findings (M, P and 
A. 2009). Furthermore, the aim of the study is to understand and analyze opportunities and 
challenges, rather than explain and describe what is happening. Therefore, it is more appropriate 
to undertake this research inductively (M, P and A. 2009). 
(M, P and A. 2009) also argue that it is worth mentioning what way is used to carry out research 
by selecting either the deductive or inductive approach; they add, however, that one should not 
blindly follow these approaches because they are misleading and of no real practical value. 
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7.3. Research Strategy 
The characteristics of this paper would be referred to as an embedded case study, “… gaining a 
rich understanding of the context of the research and the processes being enacted…”  (M, P and 
A. 2009). They also added “… the case study strategy also has considerable ability to generate 
answers to the question “Why?” as well as “What?” and “How?” questions…” (M, P and A. 
2009). 
This paper comprises mostly on qualitative research, primarily because of a serious lack of data 
and correct figures from the case under study that is the Gwadar Port. Most of the recent data 
that could contain actual numbers regarding the performance of the port from the time of 
inauguration are not available. Therefore, no actual figures can represent the eventual 
development or the fruits the Gwadar port has born. Other constraints in attaining accurate and 
meaningful data include the socio-political and economic situation, in its most critical form in the 
very province in which Gwadar is located. 
It was not possible to carry out field research due to constraints of access to the port, or to 
hardcopies of data. Direct contact with related sources and personnel was also not possible, 
given time and cost constraints.  
This thesis is about the Gwadar port and its economic opportunities and challenges. Since the 
research is focusing on one single case, it is synonymous with case studies. The paper also has a 
great opportunity of observing the case of the Gwadar port post its completion, something is 
unique to this study. 
At least one individual directly related to Gwadar as well as Balochistan was interviewed in a 
basic non-methodical fashion for the most cases, bringing to the table some useful and 
interesting insights. The idea was to an opinion about the port project, the resulting findings 
representing only a sign of their perception, which may be, to some extent, be applicable to a few 
others. The opinions of Sikander Akram, a BS Marine Sciences student from LUAWMS (Lasbela 
University of Agriculture, Water and Marine Science) who was interviewed are of important 
consideration, given his Baloch background. 
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8. SCOPE OF WORK & LIMITATIONS  
The port of Gwadar along with the planned industrial zones and export processing zones are a 
very essential move in the economy of Balochistan as well Pakistan. This paper could have been 
more specific with respect to the effect of these developments and their contribution to 
economic indicators. These projects are, however, still in infancy despite planning and work that 
stems from at least a decade. Nevertheless, the economic importance of these projects cannot be 
undermined. 
As most previous research has been carried out before, there has been no data available as many 
of the infrastructure developments envisioned are hardly in place. The much promising 
revolution the Gwadar port was hoped to bring suffers dearly, and only literary work has been 
used to conclude the previous papers. The port is yet to deliver estimated performance, and 
therefore, there is hardly any data available that can measures its success or conclude otherwise. 
A serious lack of availability of information of any shipping data, or any relevant costs, tariffs or 
relevant variables is absent. There is a serious inconsistency in that data that is somewhat 
available. There is either minimal or no access to even nearby sources to retrieve any relevant 
information. Furthermore, a statistical assessment or implementation of economic models to 
determine Gwadar port’s effects on the overall economy of the country, as performance of the 
port in its current condition is not formidable to have macroeconomic effects. For these reasons, 
most of the research has been carried out via the internet or whatever any other resources could 
assist. 
 
9. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
There have been rare instances of research on Gwadar, much due to the apparent infancy of the 
project. Most of the research has been done before the actual launch of the project, suggesting 
not enough accuracy of trends or indicators since most of the findings would have been 
theoretical and hypothetical. Furthermore, due to lack of availability of data and other facts, 
much of the research is qualitative. There still aren’t many figures or relevant data available to 
quantify the attributes of the port or provide a discrete conclusion of the level of success or 
failure. 
The research by (Jahanzeb 2006) is quite interesting considering certain direct implications with 
competing ports, highlighting major trends of oil and gas energy production in the world, with 
intense focus in the potential of Central Asian countries further triggering Gwadar’s potential. 
The paper used certain direct variables, as in one case, comparing total transit distance, with, and 
without Gwadar. A few instances, it illustrated that Gwadar would have shortest routes through 
some regions, making it more a competitive choice than the alternatives. However, the paper 
undermined and overlooked the actual costs that would be incurred to establish these roads and 
rail links which would suggest otherwise, which will be further elaborated in this paper. Key 
findings of (Jahanzeb 2006) are that a necessary infrastructure needs to be in place to fully 
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benefit from Gwadar’s potential. Adequate promotion of the port is also necessary along with 
parallel industrial developments that favor the same. 
(Anwar 2011) has reiterated on the much repeated features and potential of the Gwadar port, 
citing certain elements as insecurity in Afghanistan and generally, Terrorism and lack of safety 
and insecurity in the region to be formidable obstacles; if these issues are treated properly, 
Gwadar could thrive, the writing suggests. However, the authors have seriously undermined that 
these ‘issues’ and ‘obstacles’ are predominantly out of control of stakeholders of Gwadar; the 
situation in Afghanistan is an almost entirely separate and exclusive matter, addressing which is 
not exactly on their ‘to do’ list. 
Perhaps the closest and most interesting work is of (Hassan 2005), though still at a premature 
time. The author has highlighted various developments that are required – these range from 
setting up necessary transportation and communications network as well as industrial and 
economic zones, ceasing income tax, purusing low-cost and renewable energy sources, minimal 
government intervention, and permission of foreign land occupation, among several others. The 
author has, however, overlooked that industrial and economic zones are already planned 
aggressively, and more will not follow until and unless they bear fruit first. Discontinuing income 
tax could severely disrupt government revenue. Foreign ownership would be extremely hard to 
attract, give the situation of Pakistan, and more so, that of Balochistan, where Gwadar lies. These 
research papers, and most others, have lacked in depicting a factual position and the trend ahead. 
This paper would fill in that gap and would also be a fresh and recent account of the port project 
of Gwadar, encouraging this research to have taken place. 
None of the previous researches have, however, determined the performance of the port, or 
have concluded how successful Gwadar has been in achieveing the expected economic targets. 
Furthermore, none of the papers on Gwadar have considered standard port theories or made an 
assessment of the level of these theories put to practice at the port. 
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10. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
10.1. Importance & Significance of Sea Trade 
The importance of the availability and maintenance of trade ports is to help expand the scope of 
producers’ markets for exports, as well as consumers’ markets for imports. For goods and 
services either unavailable of costly, ports help import such goods and services and save costs. 
An increased variety and quality is made available by these hubs advocating open markets and 
economies. 
Foreign investment and resources are also easily entertained. Growth for jobs in general and 
related industries in particular (i.e. transportation, handling, management, supplies and logistics) 
is also triggered. Both the trade host and guest economies (i.e. local and foreign) thrive and grow 
due to trade, where exchange of goods, services, skills as well as a cash cycles commences. 
 
Trade is a major constituent of the economy, and pivotal to the growth of globalization and 
economic prosperity. In fact, World Container Trade has witnessed more growth than the 
combined global GDP growth (Bingham 2007). 
 
 
Figure III: World Container Trade compared to World GDP Growth5 
Source: Global Insight, Inc. 
 
Furthermore, the trend of the global container trade is believed to be doubled by 2020 of what it 
was in 2008 (please refer to the next figure).  
                                            
5 Figure obtained from Global Insight, Inc. (Bingham 2007). 
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Figure IV: World Container Trade Growth (Estimated)6 
Source: Global Insight, Inc. 
 
Increase globalization and trade liberates financial markets providing them with a bigger avenue 
of exchange of goods, capital and services. It also provides faster growth, and broadens business 
horizons. A few countries like China, Singapore, Netherlands and the United Arab Emirates 
have trade contributing to a significant volume to their GDP. 
10.2. Evolution of Ports 
A. First Generation Prior to 1950 
Sea approach, transfer of goods, temporary 
storage, delivery. 
B. Second Generation  
Includes A, plus industrial and commercial 
activities which give added value to the goods. 
The port is a handling and services center. 
C. Third Generation Since 1980 
Includes A, plus B, plus structuring of the port 
community, plus strengthening links between 
town and port and between port-users, plus 
extension of the range of sendees offered 
beyond the port boundary, plus an integrated 
system of data collection and processing. The 
port has become a logistics platform for trade. 
D. Fourth Generation Since 2000 
Network of physically separated ports (terminals) 
linked through common operators or through a 
common administration. 
 
Figure V: Generations of Ports 
                                            
6 Figure obtained from Global Insight, Inc. (Bingham 2007). 
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Source: UNCTAD (1999) 
In the last 60 years, ports have evolved from mere trade windows to a comprehensive economic 
infrastructure. Modern Ports have evolved drastically in recent years to be able to cater a 
multitude of complimenting services. Simple import and export is a thing of the past. These 
ports now cater an extensive logistics infrastructure that includes complimentary development of 
the network in the towns and cities they are located in. Additionally, in the vicinities of these 
ports, extensive industrial and manufacturing zones, including purposely built ones, are a normal 
trend. 
 
Most of the biggest and most successful ports around the world are fourth generation ports. 
(Verhoeven 2009) has introduced the concept of a three-dimensional fourth generation port that 
defines the modern port to be comprehensive, commercially and culturally well-connected, and 
an important element of the more global ecosystem of ports: 
 
Dimension Sub-dimension Key Features 
Operational 
Ship-shore Operations 
Core port services: cargo-handling (loading, 
unloading, storage), technical-nautical services and 
ancillary services. Strong focus on containers. 
Value-added Logistics 
Shift from core to non-core port activities (various 
paths possible). 
Industrial Activities 
Shift from traditional to sustainable industries (e.g. 
LNG installations, biofuel plants etc.). 
Spatial 
Terminalization 
Multinational operators develop networks of 
terminals under corporate logic. Competitive 
emphasis shifts to terminal level, extending into the 
supply chain. 
Port-city Separation 
Loosening of spatial relationship combined with the 
weakening of economic and societal ties (although 
first signs of re-integration initiatives appear - see 
societal dimension). 
Regionalization 
Network development beyond the port perimeter, 
involves co-operation with inland ports and dry 
ports (load center development) as well as with 
other seaports in proximity. 
Societal 
Ecosystems 
Seaport is part of a wider (coastal) ecosystem where 
it has a variety of environmental interactions with 
the outside. 
Human Factor 
Sustainable co-habitation with local communities, 
focus on avoiding negative (pollution, congestion 
etc.) and stimulating positive externalities (soft 
values). 
 
Figure VI:  Verhoeven’s Three-dimensional “Fourth Generation” Multi-purpose Gateway Port 
Concept 
Source: (Verhoeven 2009) 
 
It has also been emphasized that having all dimensions is important, but it is all the more pivotal 
to successfully and efficiently integrate all three dimensions together for sustained profitable 
operations. 
10.3. Role of Port Authorities 
Globalization and the ever-changing competition and marketing environments have necessitated 
strict and stringent yet flexible port practices. It is indeed the survival of the fittest, and much is 
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expected from port operations, and thus, the authorities that operate them. A wider range of 
logistics networks and provision of value-added services is imperative. Despite the undeniably 
important role of Port Authorities, Carriers, Terminal Operators and Logistics Service Providers 
are thought to have more power over port-oriented logistics – much of this is market driven. 
Port Authorities are often criticized for negative impact on port performance, even when they 
are not responsible for such influences (Verhoeven 2009). 
Since the introduction of containers, modern sea trade consists of a huge chunk of them, and 
containerization has set the standard of the method of freight as well as a measure of scale of a 
port (Verhoeven 2009). 
Private operations of ports have also been recently emphasized to optimize port performance. 
Although ports have been publically managed in the past, a mix of public and private, or in more 
contemporary settings, complete privatization of port authority functions have been witnessed, 
optimum implementations of which have resulted in successful operations. The United 
Kingdom, New Zealand, Morocco, and in recent times, United Arab Emirates and a few other 
Middle Eastern countries have demonstrated this example well. However, overall government 
objectives are to be monitored in scenarios of privatization of ports. In addition, investments for 
the development of the required infrastrucure are expected to arrive from the Port Authority and 
port operators. 
10.4. Port Financing  
Recent developments in global ports have illustrated that although port financing used to be a 
municipal, state or national process, exposure and globalization has made it a private affair, 
partially or even completely. Naturally, any port under consideration must demonstrate potential 
and promising economic returns in future to continue to attract investments. Foreign Direct 
Investment is also a key ingredient to the realization of the construction a port, all the more 
particular in case of developing countries. However, it is a continuos process, as certain theorists 
highlight (UNCTAD 1996). It is further believed that positive results of private investments, and 
for that matter, all the investments in a port can be witnessed in one to two years – the gestation 
period. In case of no notable improvement or sustainable performance in this timespan, it can be 
affirmed that strategic implementaions were incorrect and miscalculated, and that they should be 
revisited (UNCTAD 1996). 
10.5. Regional Cooperation 
A very important aspect of globalization that could be eminent for port operation is optimal 
cooperation within the region of countries with common interests. Cooperation at insitutional, 
industrial or commercial level could be between port authorities, operators, ministries or 
governments. Sharing of trade networks, training, tariff standardization, joint ventures etc., are a 
few avenues co-players could work with. Complimenting each other for a win-win strategy has 
generally illustrated positive outcome for all participants (UNCTAD 1996). 
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10.6. Gwadar: Relevant Theories 
10.6.1. Development & Potential 
Given the capacity of the ports, and an already available landscape in the southwestern parts of 
Pakistan, the need for an additional seaport only encouraged development of Gwadar. Such 
traffic, notably from the Central Asian States and Afghanistan would be handled here. Equally 
significant is the national defense need for redundancy in the communication infrastructure. 
Evidence suggested that Pakistan’s naval complexes near a single port area (Karachi) would not 
have been adequate enough in times of crisis and war, thus further bringing attention to not just 
economic, but strategic military development at Gwadar (Masood 2004). 
Gwadar’s role is indeed imperative, the port having been stated several times to be in lying in the 
energy corridor of the region. Petroleum & crude oil transportation is at the top of the list. With 
herculean quantities of oil that moves through in the near waters – the Strait of Hormuz, 
through which 35% of the world’s sea-borne oil passes (Administration 2011) – the potential of 
the port is tremendous, if optimally exploited. 
Gwadar is Pakistan’s third port. If exploited to its fullest, it would be the largest port of the 
country, and not only that; Gwadar could very easily be one of the most important ports of the 
Middle East and Central Asian region. It would connect the Great Asian Dragon (China) with 
the Oil-rich Arabs. It is a warm-water port; it operates all year. It is a deep-sea port, and can 
handle the largest ships. It can connect India and China – the two most populous countries – 
directly to the Middle East. 
Theoretically, Gwadar would be a strong candidate for the completion of a fourth generation 
port, and would have all complimenting industrial and infrastructural amenities that successful 
ports like the Port of Jabel Ali have. 
 
 
Arthur D. Little (Malaysia), the main consultant firm of the Gwadar Development Phases, cited 
the following great opportunities the port city has, and the resulting benefits (Little 2006): 
 Low Cost Land & Labor Available 
> Industrial Complexes and Labor-intensive Units 
 Proximity to Oil & Gas Resources as well Fast Growing Gulf Countries 
> Import Export Opportunities & Relevant Refineries/Industries 
 Proximity to Major Shipping Lanes 
> Shipping Repair and other Relevant Industries 
 Some Agricultural and Mineral Resources 
> Food processing, Fisheries and Mineral Extraction/Processing 
 Tax-Free Status for Investments and Trade 
> Export Manufacturing 
 
One of the greatest add-ons Gwadar has is being a hub port, placing it even more strategically 
than the other two ports of Pakistan. A hub port is one that not only handles the local port 
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demands, but also caters trans-shipments. The shipment arriving at a hub port suggests that the 
port is not its final destination, but a ‘connecting’ station, making the port an ‘intermediary’ host 
for cargo. 
Serving as a hub increases the scale of trade of the port, multiplying porting and deporting 
volume significantly, and it would be in Gwadar’s favor to handle this increased scale of work 
and shipping volumes alike. Records indicate that Pakistani ports other than Gwadar handled 60 
million tonnes in 2011, a volume which would increase predictably to more than 75 million 
tonnes by 2015 (Masood 2004), necessitating the flexibility and handling capacity by the presence 
of another port – none other than of course, Gwadar. 
Whereas the Azerbaijan and the Stans of Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan) 
having reserves of US$ 4 Trillion worth of oil and gas resources, it has been sighted that by 2050, 
the Central Asian states would account for up to 80% of oil for the United States. More so, 
Saudi Arabia has a joint venture in China to establish a US$ 3.6 Billion oil refinery that will be 
using oil imported from the Arabian Gulf (Jahanzeb 2006). With oil demands predicted to 
continue to rise for years to come, it would require significant and multiple transit routes for 
shipments, of which Gwadar could be an important part. 
It was pointed out that distance for shipments moving from Urumqi in China coming to Dubai 
and London could be halved from 14,400 km to 6,900 km, saving significant transit time, as the 
distance from Dubai to Khunjerab is 5,300 km (APP 2011). 
Linkage of trade routes with Afghanistan in the west are also very promising, for Afghanistan is a 
country with the “world’s largest deposits of copper and large deposits of high-grade iron ore 
besides unexploited reserves of oil, gas, coal and precious stone” (Jahanzeb 2006). 
Gwadar’s natural features can also not be undermined, which would be more obvious in a few 
decades; due to global warming and increased trends of erosion of shores, ports that are on 
sandy coasts are jeopardized. However, Gwadar is a rocky shore, and doesn’t require preemptive 
measures to protect it from tides and waves; it already has a natural defense of mountains and 
rocks (Akram 2012). 
10.6.2. Port Competition, Free Trade & Tax Holidays 
The government of Pakistan extended tax exemptions and tax holidays at various industrial 
zones and duty-free economic zones in the area to attract investments and trade volume at 
Gwadar, on pretty much the same lines of few of the Gulf and Iranian ports. This also includes a 
concession agreement (CA) of 40 years to The Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) that includes 
tax exemption. These initiatives, taken on the same footings as the new international trend in 
port operation would also be priceless for the successful operation of the port. 
A proposed Export Processing Zone (EPZ) near Gwadar port for local and foreign investors 
also includes exemptions on customs, sales tax and excise duty (I. H. News 2007). 
Iran, due to international sanctions and difficulties, has been significantly isolated from 
international trade and transshipments through its ports. Then there are capacity constraints the 
country’s ports suffer, as far as goods shipping from Central Asia are concerned. Even Pakistan’s 
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other two ports are operating at almost maximum capacity (Hassan 2005). All this gives Gwadar 
a better shot at business and market presence. 
10.6.3. The Road and Rail Network 
An extensively planned rail network to supply oil from the Persian Gulf to Xinjiang could 
integrate Pakistani links with the Chinese and the Iranian. 
Already existing roads near the Afghan border could also be improved to support Gwadar’s 
trade routes (Hashmi 1999). Prefeasibility studies for a 660 km long rail track between Havelian 
and Khunjerab has been completed, estimated at a cost of at least US$ 10 Billion, with no further 
developments having taken place yet (APP 2011). 
Pakistan and China signed a memorandum of understanding 2006 to upgrade Karakoram 
Highway in order to connect Kashgar and Abbottabad, eventually joining Xinjiang with the 
Gilgit-Baltistan region (Jaffrelot 2011). 
If a road network were established with the Central Asian countries, transit through Gwadar 
would be the shortest distance, as in case Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Jahanzeb 2006). 
10.6.4. China: The Dragon’s Role 
China accepted its role in developing the port as well as to adjoin the rail network of Pakistan 
with their track in Xinjiang. The resulting path, along with a similar road network “would be the 
shortest route for oil transport from the Persian Gulf” (Masood 2004). This was considered by 
Chinese to save both time and costs. China’s assistance was also requested for the development 
of the new Gwadar International Airport; a Chinese company demonstrated support there as 
well. 
The primary significance of the Gwadar port, other that of course to Pakistan, is to China. China 
is also the major financer of the development of the port, providing almost US$ 200 Million 
along with 450 professionals and engineers (Jaffrelot 2011) for Phase I of the project. The port is 
the latest development in a long haul of Chinese-Pakistani cooperation on several mutual 
economic – and in rare cases, military – projects. Regardless of the potential interests of other 
governments in investing or developing Gwadar, China has so far been the most resilient. From 
consumer goods to developing natural resources and countless mining projects commenced in 
Balochistan, China “has been the biggest foreign investor and partner in the development of 
Gwadar port for commercial shipping as well as an energy hub” (Fazl-e-Haider 2009). 
From 60 percent of Pakistan’s military systems and equipment being Chinese, and several mutual 
projects the countries have worked on (Masood 2004), Gwadar is another example in the endless 
list of collaborations. Furthermore, bilateral trade between the countries had risen to US$ 8.7 
Billion in 2010, increasing four times over a span of 8 years, growing 28% annually. Pakistani and 
Chinese exports are growing by 30 % by 25% respectively. A total of 13,000 Chinese are working 
in 120 enterprises in Pakistan (APP 2011). 
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In 2011, Premier Wen Jiabao, during his visit to the country, signed trade deals and MOUs of 
almost US $35 billion’s worth (Collins 2011), significantly re-strengthening China’s economic 
interests in Pakistan and reiterating upon mutual collaboration of the two nations. 
A Gwadar Petrochemical City project was announced in 2006 by The Great United Petroleum 
Holdings Company Limited (GUPC), where the company signed agreements “to conduct a 
feasibility study”. In the long run, up to 2,000 service stations were to set up in the country. A 
refinery with a capacity of up to 200,000 barrels per day with capacity being doubled afterwards 
was also announced, eventually proposing 12,000 acres of land projects (Fazl-e-Haider 2009). 
In the earlier period of the development of the port, and it is quite possible way before that time 
that the Chinese would have considered Gwadar to include in its, as commonly termed String of 
Pearls (China’s sea-lines of communication) for the Asian/African region (Wikipedia 2012). 
As the United States in the west, and Russia and India to the north and south criticize frequently, 
China has had intense focus on its global access points. The Asian giant has been keen on 
keeping a systematic and well-integrated network along its borders, which has given it 
considerable outposts to observe various global movements and implications. Pakistan is already 
a territory considered more than friendly; such a plan of action to include Gwadar in its ever-
growing paws could naturally be an attraction for the dragon to, as (Lee 2011) puts it, “bathing 
its vermilion claws in the milk-warm waters of the Indian Ocean”. 
 
 
11. GWADAR: WHAT WAS PLANNED 
11.1. The Port: Phase I 
The Gwadar news made many headlines, especially in the local community. Globally, it brought 
news of investment interests from Britain and Poland to the Middle East, China and the rest of 
the Asia Pacific (T. News, Britain, Poland show interest in Balochistan 2007). In fact, decades 
earlier, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto proposed collaboration with the United States for the 
development of Gwadar (Jaffrelot 2011). Finally, President Musharraf kick-started the port 
project in 2002 (Ahmed 2012) with major support from China. 
When the crystals of the Gwadar mix solidified, however, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar 
and China and Singapore were amongst the few countries left to have a formidable role in 
investments and development of the port city – and to a rare extent – the rest of Balochistan. 
Arthur D. Little, Malaysia, Lyon Associates, USA and Indus Associated Pakistan prepared 
feasibilities for the Master plan of the port (Anwar 2011). Phase I at a cost of almost US$ 300 
Million was completed in 2007, with majority of the support coming from China (2/3rd of the 
costs, apart from technical assistance). It includes three (3) multipurpose berths, each 200 meters 
long and, is capable of handling vessels up to 30,000 DWT (Masood 2004). Phase II was planned 
for development by the private sector, at a cost of US$ 600-850 million, to be completed by 
2010. The estimates contained ten (10) more berths along with a 5-kilometer approach channel. 
These channels would have the capacity for vessels up to 50,000 DWT (Hashmi 1999). If both 
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phases are made operational, Gwadar could operate at a capacity of at least half of that of the 
Port of Karachi, and, at a few berths, ships and tankers twice the size of those docking at either 
Port Muhammad bin Qasim or the Port of Karachi (Rehman 2003). The Federal Government 
also announced almost US$ 15 Million in 2008 for the establishment of a 1000-acre Export 
Processing Zone at the port, whereas the Baloch provincial government also set aside some US$ 
150,000 for a sports complex and a hospital, adding that they are “in progress” (S. F.-e.-H. News 
2008). 
Reports indicate that plans for development of Gwadar were formalized in 1993, but it wasn’t 
until 2002 that construction of Gwadar Port began. Pervaiz Musharraf, then-president of 
Pakistan, revisited plans for development of Gwadar amidst an otherwise political imbalance and 
a critical position of the country. At the time, Pakistan was dealing with political instability issues 
with a Martial Law administration still in place. No thanks to the 9-11 incident, or the War on 
Terror initiative of the United States, which further worsened the situation for the country and 
its inhabitants, placing blame over them, and at the same time, asking for their utmost support to 
eradicate terrorism in the region. Nevertheless, Pakistan approached China and major MOUs 
and agreements were signed followed by formalized developments afterwards. 
 
 
Figure VII – The Gwadar Port Master Plan7 
Source: Al Noor Associates/Gwadar News 
 
                                            
7 Figure obtained from http://www.gwadarnews.com/gwadarphotos/gwadarmasterplan.jpg. 
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The First Phase of the Gwadar Master plan was completed in 2005, with the city going under 
major construction from 2002 until 2007, with relatively slower development afterwards. In 
2004, the 653 km-long Makran Coastal Highway (N10) was completed by Pakistan's National 
Highway Authority (NHA), linking Gwadar with Karachi while passing through Pasni and 
Ormara. The Asian Development Bank also pooled in US$ 500 Million into Pakistan’s account 
to improve the road network in the country (Hassan 2005). The Gwadar Development Authority 
was established in 2003, overseeing the planning and development of Gwadar. Gwadar Industrial 
Estate Development Authority was established to promote industrial activities the city. Gwadar 
was connected with the Sindh province in 2004 via the M8 section of the Motorway. A 50-year 
Master Plan for Gwadar was conceived in 2006. Initial international funding and interest was 
initiated by China, which provided 80%, or US$ 198 Million of the US$ 248 million Sino-Pak 
agreement signed in March 2002. Pakistan pooled in US$ 50 Million (Masood 2004). The China 
Harbor Construction Corporation was nominated for construction of the port (Hashmi 1999). 
Phase I of the construction of the Gwadar Port cost US$ 298 million (I. H. News 2007). The 
government of Pakistan has also extended tax exemptions and tax holidays at various industrial 
zones and duty-free economic zones in the area. 
11.2. Phase II and Other Initiatives 
Phase II was to be completed by 2010 at a cost of roughly US$ 840 million, making Gwadar a 
likely stop and to become one of the busiest ports of the region. Facilities ranging from 
warehousing, trans-shipment and industrial centers for trade with over 20 countries, including 
Gulf Countries, Iran, Central Asian States, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, China and East Africa, 
were to be deployed. 
To enhance oil-related trade and related processing industries, oil refineries were to be set up, 
again, with foreign collaboration. 
In the north of Gwadar about 30 km from the port, a Special Industrial Development Zone 
(SIDZ) over 4,000 hectares of area would also be set up for various industries. 
The Federal Government (Islamabad) was to provide US$ 12 million to Balochistan to meet 15 
years water demand of the Gwadar Industrial Estate (GIE) through installation of a desalination 
plant, where there was no source of clean water at the time. Both recycling of wastewater 
(irrigation/industrial cooling) and the planned desalination plant would satisfy the water 
requirements in the area. 
In collaboration to the government plan, Balochistan provided 3,000 acres of land – 20 acres to 
of it to set up the water desalination plant and facilities. This would bring the cost of water 
supplied to the area locally to almost 1/3rd of the cost otherwise incurred to obtain water from 
tankers. 
The Gwadar Industrial Estate (GIE) was looking at around 2,000 industrial units, employing 
30,000 workers. Production would be export-oriented, bringing foreign exchange to the country 
(I. H. News 2007). Gwadar was forcasted to create three (3) Million jobs, with most of the 
Baloch locals to be employed there (A. -G. News 2008). 
An expansion of the Phase II was also a motorway stretching down to Balochistan and the areas 
close to the port to support industrial installations and oil and gas related facilities and storage 
centers (S. F.-e.-H. News 2008). 
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Pakistan also had plans to construct a US$ 1.5 Billion railway link with China at Kasghar from 
Havelian along with another parallel project to link Afghanistan at Kandhar with Quetta (Anwar 
2011). 
The United Arab Emirates also planned their Khalifa Oil refinery for Gwadar with a capacity of 
up to 300,000 barrels per day; in 2007, Abu Dhabi’s IPIC signed an agreement of at least US$ 5 
Billion to construct the refinery. The project is scheduled for completion in 2012 (Fazl-e-Haider 
2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
11.3. Military Developments 
Pakistan had envisioned that it would also support its naval base in Karachi from Gwadar city 
and naturally, the Gwadar Port. 
Conflict with India have stemmed from the time of independence of the two countries back in 
1947. For the last half a century, moments of hoaxes and rumors, with a few of these even 
following through the realm of reality, have surfaced. From news of India holding up water of 
the rivers flowing into Pakistan to India creating blockages in the seas leading to international 
waters have haunted the nation, at least psychologically anyhow, if not physically. 
Hampering of our supply lines was also expected after the Kargil War of 1999. Gwadar gave the 
government solace in establishing an alternate gateway, must other channels be compromised 
(Hashmi 1999). 
On September 6, 2007, news surfaced that the Pakistan Army GHQ was showing interest in 
acquiring 11,000 acres of land at the port to build a Defense center, then named as the 
Combined Defense Complex, or CDC. 
The government argued that the law and order situation in Balochistan had not been promising, 
and thus, such a military establishment at the port would a) provide the defense headway to the 
seas and give them international access, b) provide security to the port. The government has 
gone to the extent to establishing two garrisons in Balochistan, and the military infrastructure to 
be set up at the port has been termed by one source as “making the port safe and secure for 
international trade” (Rana 2007). 
Pakistan's navy could also find it easier to operate closer to the Gulf. In times of [probable] 
threat, the military could always divert assets and control towards the western coasts of the 
country. Pakistan would have the ability to more strategically operate against the Indian forces, if 
need be. However, Gwadar is well within range of Indian missile attack (Masood 2004). 
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11.4. The Gwadar International Airport 
An airport of international standards at Gwadar was conceived back in 2002 when then-
President Musharraf revisited plans of the city and, more importantly, the port (Tribune 2011). 
The Civil Aviation Authority of Pakistan acquired 4,300 acres in 2007 to construct the New 
Gwadar International Airport on 6,000 acres, 26 km northeast of the current airport (A. -G. 
News 2008). The airport was announced to the largest terminal in the province, estimated then at 
a cost of US$ 125 million. Oman had provided Pakistan $17 million in 2008 to set up the airport, 
with the Pakistani government announcing its own contribution of US$ 11 Million at the budget 
of 2008-09 (S. F.-e.-H. News 2008). 
 
The new airport, once complete, would be equipped with facilities for both passengers and cargo 
handling (Tribune 2011). Naturally, for a port of this magnitude, and a multitude of possible 
trade routes from Iran and Afghanistan, to Central Asian countries, extending to India, would 
require additional sources of transportation. An airport of such standards would complement the 
potential of Gwadar’s port. 
Additionally, in 2010, a flight of Rayyan Air “inaugurated the first Islamabad to Kashgar cargo 
flight” (APP 2011), bringing forth all possible sources that could be exploited to diverse the 
methods of transshipments. 
11.5. The Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) 
PSA was one of the bidders for the Gwadar Port Operation project. The company, through their 
subsidiary PSA Gwadar Ltd signed a 40-year concession agreement with the GDA (Gwadar 
Development Authority) on February 6, 2007. Thereby, PSA was prized with rights to operate 
the port, and a 40-year on tax exemptions and holidays (International 2007), however, followed 
by concerns from both the World Bank as well as the Asian Development Bank. However, the 
PSA highlighted that they would be investing, for starters, US$ 550 Million at the port, which 
gave it favorable nods from the Federal Government (I. H. News 2007). 
PSA commenced its operations in 2008, with the first ship docking at the port in March. 
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12. GWADAR: THE COMPETITION 
The introduction and development of Gwadar has been very late with respect to other ports in 
the vicinity that have had a head start. To the disadvantage of Gwadar, these ports represent 
economies that are much more stable than Gwadar’s mainland. These ports received more 
attention from their governments, are more focused, and do not have to suffer from the inherent 
obstacles that still hold Gwadar in its chains. Initially, the port is expected to face competition 
from Port Salalah of Oman (I. H. News 2007). 
The World Port Source (Port 2012) lists ports according to five (5) categories. There are the 
largest ports in the world i.e. the Ports of Singapore, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hong Kong, and 
Shanghai etc.; there are ones that are large i.e. Port of London, Chicago, and those that are 
medium i.e. Ports of Jebel Ali, Karachi, Salalah, Khalifa.  Lastly, there are smaller ones like 
Gwadar, and several very small ones. The details of the ports competing with Gwadar are as 
follows: 
 
12.1.1. India 
India has at least 76 and small, medium and large ports spanned well over all the coasts of the 
peninsula. At least 15 of them are in well within an 800 km range of the Karachi ports, and 600 
to 1000 km range of Gwadar. Half of them are medium sized ports, a serious competition to the 
relatively smaller sized Gwadar port. 
 
12.1.2. Kuwait 
The Port of Doha of Kuwait is a relatively smaller sized port. The Port of Shuwaikh, however, is 
Kuwait’s most formidable port, situated in the Persian Gulf. It has a power station and a water 
desalinization plant for Kuwait city and is quite developed, containing adequate port-related 
facilities as well as markets. The port also has deep berths, and handles cargo ships, fishery 
containers and even passenger vessels. Its depth ranges from 7.5 to 9 feet, and the dredging is 8 
km long, the port being almost 800 acres on land and 300 acres on water. The Port of Shuaiba, 
the country’s other formidable port is a well-established industrial center that has “an oil refinery, 
a petrochemical plant, and a seafood-packing plant” and “one of the biggest seawater 
desalinization plants in the world” (Port 2012). The port was made as a compliment for the 
industry, and handles raw materials and various other kinds of cargos. At a depth of 10 to 14 
meters, it is 4 km long. All of the Kuwaiti ports are operated by the Kuwaiti Port Authority. 
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Figure VIII – The Ports of the Region8 
Source: World Port Source/Google Maps 
12.1.3. Bahrain 
The Port of Mina Sulman is a medium-sized port of Bahrain’s capital, Manamah. It is almost 250 
acres with 600-meter long berths. Eighty percent of the cargo is container based. Port Sitra is a 
relatively smaller port of the country. 
 
12.1.4. Qatar 
The Port of Ras Laffan of Qatar is primarily an oil industry based port, with aggressive 
deployment of relevant infrastructure. Interesting to note is its operating “the world’s biggest 
liquidized natural gas export facility” (Port 2012) over 2100 acres. It is almost 18 km long. The 
other medium-sized port is the Port of Doha, and a smaller one, the Port of Mesaieed that is for 
small boats and jetties. 
 
12.1.5. United Arab Emirates 
Handling almost a million tonnes of cargo each year, the famous Port Zayed of United Arad 
Emirates is one of the two flagship ports of the emirates. The port spreads over 1260 acres, has 
21 berths with and an annual throughput of 2,000 vessels. 
                                            
8 Figure obtained from http://maps.google.com/. 
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The other flagship port of the Emirates is the Port of Jebel Ali, the biggest port in the region, 
home to the world’s largest man-made harbor (Port 2012). Host to thousands of companies 
from hundreds of countries, armed with the state-of-the-art port handling and timed loading, 
linked to the airport, containing extended storage for oil products, raw materials and perishables 
alike, and the capacity to hold large vessels, the Port of Jebel Ali is a true inspiration for all other 
ports in the region. It has even attracted the US Navy’s attention, being their most visited port 
(Port 2012). It is also close to other attractions in Dubai, harboring even more revenue. 
The Khalifa Port project of Abu-Dhabi is was scheduled for completion in 2010. Though the 
project fell behind schedule, it will be ready in late 2012. At a cost of almost US$ 7 Billion, the 
port is 90% complete, with a supporting industrial zone spanning over more 417 square km also 
more than half complete. With the port aimed at contribution more than 1/10th of the GDP of 
the United Arab Emirates besides oil-related income (Zawya 2012), the port will be a serious 
challenger for competitor ports in the region. The port of Fujairah is a relatively small port 
project, with capacity for general and bulk cargo. 
The Port of Khor Fakkan is one of Sharjah’s three ports, mainly exporting to the subcontinent. 
The Port of Hamriyah is a free trade zone, with no taxation. The port also deals with South 
Asian markets, as well as African and Australian ones. Port Khalid of Sharjah has been an 
important port for three hundred years up to the 19th century. It contains 21 berths dedicated to 
a multitude of options and cargo-type handling. 
Dubai’s Port Rashid is a fabricated port. Even though it contains up to 35 berths, the Emirate is 
focusing on shifting the traffic to the Jebel Ali. 
 
12.1.6. Oman 
Much of Oman’s economy is based on trade. The Port of Salalah is Oman’s main port, one that 
is deep-water, capable of handling the largest of vessels. It goes up to 16 meters deep. The main 
purpose of the port, given its premier location and huge handling capacity makes it perfect for 
trans-shipments. This port is a very direct competitor of the Gwadar port. Also formidable is the 
Port of Sultan Quboos, another medium-sized port a, apart from which, Oman has three smaller 
ports; the Port of Sohar, the Port of Muscat, and the Port of Qalhat. 
 
12.1.7. Iran 
Iran has six ports – three of them being the Port of Khorramshahr, the Imam Khomeini Port 
and the Port of Bushehr, which are at a considerable distance from Gwadar. 
The Port of Shahid Rajai however, is Iran’s busiest port, with major exports being oil-related 
goods. The Port of Bandar Abbas is another medium sized port. The Port of Chabahar is the 
closest port to Gwadar. However, this a small sized port. Shahid Beheshti is another upcoming 
port being developed by Iran. 
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12.1.8. Pakistan 
The Karachi Port is Pakistan’s largest port with a throughput of 1.7 Million TEUs (Twenty-foot 
equivalent units9) in 2011. The Port Muhammad Bin Qasim is a relatively medium-sized port that 
had a shipment throughput of almost 900,000 TEUs in 2011 (Port 2012). 
Pakistan itself is working on a fourth port project, the Pakistan Deep Water Container Port 
(PDWCP) at Keamari Groyne in Karachi, where almost US$ 1.2 Billion is expected to be 
incurred (US$ 600 Million for Phase I) by the time of completion of the project in 2013-2014 
(Trust 2009). The Karachi Port Trust (KPT) expects it to be the major breadwinner by then and 
has already awarded the construction of Phase I to Hong Kong based Hutchison Port Holdings 
(C. A. Today 2012). 
 
 
13. GWADAR: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
13.1. The Government’s Role 
To civilize the situation at Gwadar (where any major development there also contributes to the 
province as a whole), a Civic center has also been almost completed. Spanning over more than 
5,000 yards, this center is dedicated to offices, banks, halls and other business related amenities, 
further complimenting and providing support facilities to trade (Pakistan 2012). 
In light of so much tension that had flared up amongst the Baloch people (of ‘Pakistani 
intervention’ in the province), The Chief of Army Staff finally did take a favorable on April 16, 
2012, when he announced the military’s cooperation with the provincial government. To the 
relief of the people, which one could hope would be long lasting, he declared the army not 
carrying out any further military operations in the area, without the consent and approval of the 
ministry of Balochistan. He added that military presence at Sui and Gwadar in the next two 
months and in the future, no operation will take place in Balochistan without the permission of 
the provincial government. Adding to it, he also announced more opportunities and role of the 
province by highlighting that they army would enroll 5,000 Baloch youth in the force. He also 
referenced the establishment of an Army Medical School in Balochistan (Nation 2012). 
Such development should be a sign of relief for the people there, and must highlight the 
cooperation of the armed forces as well as the country on the whole, suggesting a sign of peace 
from the rest of the country – something unfortunately the Baloch people are finding hard to 
swallow. 
13.2. Gas Pipelines 
The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline (TAPI), or the Trans-Afghan Pipeline as 
it is commonly known, is one that follows Pakistan down to Balochistan province. Pakistan, 
                                            
9 The TEU is a standardized international measurement of a port’s throughput – or the amount of cargo passing in or out of the port. 
One TEU represents the volume occupied by a 20-feet container. 
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China and the other counties involved signed US$ 7 Billion worth of agreements (Anwar 2011) 
for the 1,600 km project, while China has separately signed various other pipeline projects with 
the Central Asian countries (Jahanzeb 2006). Though the project has been in serious delays 
where the first MOU was signed almost two decades ago, once the project is realized, it will have 
significant value for Gwadar. There is parallel gas pipeline project; the Iran-Pakistan-India Gas 
Pipeline (IPI), signed with Iran at almost an equally estimated cost (Anwar 2011) measuring 
some 900 km, though believed to be discouraged by the United States, in favor of (TAPI) (Lee 
2011). 
 
 
 
14. GWADAR: CURRENT SCENARIO 
14.1. Current Status 
Despite the original conception of Gwadar as a fourth generation port with several 
complimenting amenities, the port still lacks the primary features that could declare it one. With 
no real infrastructure in place to compliment and support necessary port functions, it has 
witnessed diminishing cargo handling and hardly visited by vessels. 
At the very base of the funding of Gwadar was China, which is consistent to standard theories 
and practices of contemporary port establishments. FDI fueled the development, and was the 
main catalyst, as government, state or even private investment at Gwadar is miniscule compared 
to what China pooled in. However, parallel developments at the port were not present. Quite 
ironically, where theories suggest that private parties, most particularly, the port operators and 
port authorities in this particular case are huge contributors to fiscal needs, this was not the case 
with Gwadar. The Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) who is operating the port has a miniscule 
contribution towards the whole of the project (Lee 2011), (S. TV 2010). This could very easily 
suggest a severe lack of interest from them, the results of which are evident. However, it is also 
normal to criticize Port Authorities in case of unsuccessful operation, as facts would later 
highlight. Part of the inconsistency in PSA’s commitments is intertwined in the lack of parallel 
developments, which according to PSA, are a strong necessity. 
14.2. Performance 
14.2.1. Performance: Highlights 
The port is reported to have handled about $700 million in cargo in 2009, less than half of its 
cargo capacity (S. M. Reuters 2011). The port has so far handled 120 vessels (as of 2011) carrying 
total cargo of 2,286,781 Tonnes10. 
With each container employing to 240 persons and cargos including fertilizer, wheat and sugar (I. 
K. Times 2012), the port has a long way to go to attract business and generate major income. 
                                            
10 Transportation figures of Gwadar Port from the Economic Survey of Pakistan 2011 – Ministry of Finance. 
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Figure IX: Performance Comparison – Comparable Ports11 
Source: Data from (Hassan 2005) and other port websites 
 
14.2.2. Performance: Expected vs. Actual 
Pakistan’s annual trade that has been estimated to reach 75 Million tonnes by 2015 (Hassan 
2005) has reached at least 60 Million tonnes already. Unfortunately, this doesn’t have much to do 
with Gwadar; the port is not even close to the aspired shipping volumes, estimate for as early as 
2005. 
 
Figure X: Gwadar Port – Estimated Performance12 
                                            
11 Data for Figure obtained from multiple sources. Please refer to List of Figures near the beginning of the paper for data sources. 
12 Figure based on data obtained from (Hassan 2005). 
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Data Source: (Hassan 2005) 
 
Whereas dry cargo shipment should have 3.7%, and liquid cargo, at least 1.09% year-over-year 
growth, an almost 8-time increase in dry cargo handling was witnessed, only to drop by almost 3 
times the next year. 
 
 
Figure XI: Gwadar Port Performance – Estimated Vs. Actual13 
Data Source: (Hassan 2005) / Economic Survey of Pakistan 2011 – Ministry of Finance 
 
From its inauguration to date, Gwadar port has only catered 2,286,781 tonnes of sugar, wheat 
and urea – hardly a 600,000 tonne per year average for the last 4 years. Furthermore, only dry 
cargo has been traded; liquid cargo, containers and transshipments are yet to be seen. The 
completely irregular and inconsistent performance of the port represents serious flaws in either 
policy or implementation. 
Currently, Gwadar port is at a pause. No shipments are either arriving or departing from there. 
By the Pakistani people in general, Gwadar is highlighted to be President Musharraf’s idea – the 
development seized as soon as the president departed from office. It is added by them that 
Gwadar could be a gem, lest it is handled properly. As far as the economic situation of the 
country now stands, along with the situation that has developed in Balochistan, Gwadar may be 
suspended indefinitely, citing that only some drastic changes in policies could slowly start things 
up there again. 
Gwadar is suffering from several delays, and a serious absence of supporting infrastructure. 
Other formidable foreign direct investments (some of them being the biggest in Balochistan in 
its history) have also either been pulled out, or put at a pause. The port itself is at a pause as far 
                                            
13 Data for Figure obtained from http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_11/14-Transport.pdf. 
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as trade is concerned. None of the planned economic zones, export-processing zones, roads, rail 
networks or international airports are there; it has been half a decade since any further 
developments have been made. 
An interview with Sikander Akram (Akram 2012) concluded that Gwadar is not a deep seaport in 
the true sense. It is the last one as far as ports are concerned in terms of depth, and this may not 
be untrue; it has been narrated that a lot of silt has been filled up in the dredges and the 
approach channels. Gwadar port has a depth of 14.5 meters and approach channel of 5 km, 
whereas the Port Muhammad Bin Qasim’s "Kiamari Groyne" has a depth of 16 meters. Also 
highlighted earlier is that Gwadar, by international standards, is a much smaller port, even 
compared to its Pakistani counterparts. Recently, a 70,000 tonne cargo ship arrived at the port 
yet was unable to dock there. Smaller vessels were used to dispatch that cargo to the port. 
Gwadar’s capacity has essentially been limited to 50,000 tonne of dead weight handling. 
Pakistan’s government has made several mistakes on the way to ‘develop’ Gwadar. It handed out 
licenses to unreliable port operators, sanctioned land unwittingly, failed to monitor port 
activities, making suspicious statements internationally and lost its focus in two years’ time. The 
government does not depict any national interest in the port project, and has delayed resolutions 
of several issues indefinitely. The Baloch couldn’t be any less interested, either: there are 
insurgents disrupting any favorable developments in Gwadar or Balochistan in general, and the 
Baloch are stirring up a freedom movement rather than being concerned about an economic 
future. For them, Gwadar is a step backward – not forward. 
China, the much-anticipated godparent of the project, has decided to keep its deck of cards, 
seriously considering its next move in the game of Gwadar. Investments as well as contribution 
in development from the dragon’s end has paused. The smell in the air of China’s ‘military’ plans 
at Gwadar has also added to their vigilance. 
Recent events in Pakistan have also been least supportive. With the country going through a very 
fragile phase of national and international conflicts as well as acts of terrorism, the situation for 
economic development and foreign investment has significantly reduced. There are no signs of 
the multi-billion dollar Arab or Chinese refineries or Mega-Oil cities as planned at least half a 
decade ago. 
Pakistan cannot develop Gwadar on its own: it just doesn’t have the resources. It is merely in the 
hands of international entities and foreign intervention to help realize the potential of the port 
and save such an important natural and strategic resource from going to utter waste. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
 
15. GWADAR: REASONS FOR FAILURE 
15.1. Running, Development and Maintenance 
The biggest challenge to Gwadar is none other than the completion of the port, as planned. The 
port was cited to have been non-functional for at least a year after its inauguration (S. F.-e.-H. 
News 2008), Phase II, which has been in an indefinite delay, has seriously hampered the project, 
not to mention it triggering a bad image on the reputation of the stakeholders and the 
government on the whole. 
Previous records have indicated that the port has been subject to several delays. This is clear 
from the fact when Director-General of the Gwadar Development Authority (GDA) Ahmad 
Bakhash Lehri expressed in August 2007 that the port would be operational from September 
onwards – a milestone achieved, however, at least 15 months after (S. TV 2010). 
None other than the Federal minister for Ports and Shipping himself, Mr. Qamaruzzaman Kaira 
highlighted back in 2008 that “the port wouldn’t be operational till at least 2011”, citing an 
absence of complimenting infrastructure; communication, network and utilities were not present 
(S. F.-e.-H. News 2008). 
The government had suggested that a project monitoring unit be formed within the Ministry of 
Ports and Shipping, the dilemma with Pakistan on the whole is that for every issue (domestic, 
political or economic), the first step the government announces is the formation of a directly 
relevant task force. What unfortunately follows is the foundation of yet another ‘department 
within a department’ with commencement of perks and facilities to those assigned. Several 
expenditures follow with most being a product of a miniscule corruption expedition. The results 
are wastage of resources and lack of control and accountability, with eyes barely on the task the 
force is actually formed to resolve. 
This is a clear illustration, apart from other factors influencing the project’s fate, of the 
government’s lack of interest and support for Gwadar. What is quite interesting to add is an 
incident cited by Captain Anwar Shah (Today 2012) who attended a meeting of the Economic 
Cooperation Organization (ECO) in Karachi on 19 November 2011. In his web article, he 
explained that the Turkish and Iranian delegations made very interesting and profound 
presentations while promoting their ports. However, the Pakistani participants could not benefit 
from the moment and did not promote the Gwadar port there. This makes it evident that neither 
the Government nor the Gwadar Port Authority has any department or system in place to 
handle the promotion activities related to the port, further denouncing all the hard work that has 
been put into the port, along with the potential of up to US$ 1.8 Billion in planned 
developments (Today 2012). 
The Gwadar Port Authority has also been cited not to be maintaining the port properly. The 
dredge of the draft approach channel that was 14 meters at the time of inauguration has filled up 
with silt due to stormy weather, which is now non-functional. Other issues are of the likes of the 
port suddenly ‘unable’ to allow huge vessels into the berth. Apparently, a huge vessel came in 
and had more dead weight tonnage than the designed capacity of the port’s berths (S. F.-e.-H. 
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News 2008). This refutes the port’s apparent claim of having adequate facilities and capacities of 
supporting heavy vessels. 
Ironically enough, Gwadar is left to carrying only government cargo of the TCP (Trading 
Corporation of Pakistan). Why it is even able to manage so, is due to heavy government subsidy. 
At around US$ 29 per tonne, the cargo is costing at least six times of what it would cost if 
handled via either of the Karachi ports – an obvious policy flaw (Today 2012). 
It has even been cited by (Lee 2011) that “only way to get business to Gwadar - for what 
purpose and to whose benefit it can only be imagined - was to divert cargo from Karachi”, 
further denouncing potential use of the port. The PSA failed to bring legitimate business to the 
Port, routing vessels “otherwise destined for the ports at Karachi” (Lee 2011). 
It has also been sighted that the port until would not be self-sufficient in meeting maintenance 
funds till time the port is visited by at least 21 commercial ships each week, a figure impossible to 
reach with the current situation and acclaim of the port. For now, government funds are being 
used to meet the expenses (P. Today 2010). 
15.2. PSA – Commitments Unfulfilled 
PSA has been highlighted as having exploited Gwadar for their own, taking it for the right (I. K. 
Times 2012). 
The most foremost of the commitments the PSA had made was of investing up to US$ 550 
Million at Gwadar (I. H. News 2007) to further develop the port, a rather mouthwatering treat 
for the then-Government, which probably explains why they were blindfolded into handing over 
the lock and key of the port to them and “issuing NOCs to other non-existent private operators” 
(Tribune, The Express 2012). However, down the road, the Concession Agreement, or ‘the 
license to free trade’ or more so, ‘trade as you wish’ came as a heavy price for the Gwadar Port 
Authority since according to some, the PSA invested only US $30 million, despite undertaking to 
invest at least US$ 525 Million in 5 years at the time of the agreement (Lee 2011), (S. TV 2010). 
It could not be more adequately clear with a newspaper citing the former chairperson of TCP 
bringing forth facts of how the PSA was ripping traders off with irrelevant costs, making 
Gwadar a dumb choice for any stakeholder, as compared to the two Karachi ports (W. H. 
Nation 2010). The report further emphasizes on PSA’s misrepresentation and exploitation that 
puts shipping companies at the mercy of the PSA if trading through Gwadar, with both time and 
monetary losses for no better reason, eventually “having earned more money than the port 
authority itself” (I. K. Times 2012). Of 82 ships having anchored at Gwadar till 2010, not one 
was brought in by the PSA (S. TV 2010). 
The PSA on the other hand, responds by highlighting that there are conflicting interesting with 
the ports of Karachi, and the resulting nuisance is being caused by elements aiming to disrupt 
PSA’s operations. The PSA also highlighted that the government agreed to creating an adequate 
road network along with an industrial zone to help PSA benefit from the port, whereas none of 
those demands have been met so far (S. TV 2010). 
39 
 
 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not hesitate to go the extent of “instructing the Gwadar 
Port Authority to cancel PSA's Concession Agreement”, making it highly unlikely that the PSA 
continues its operations for 40 years as previously planned (Lee 2011), (P. Today 2010). Some 
are even of the opinion that the government wants to clean the mess up and now looks up to 
China to transfer port operation rights to (Tribune, The Express 2012). 
15.3. The Government’s Role 
The government’s lack of planning, or at least, the execution of the plan led to internal conflicts 
between institutions. For the last half decade, the government is in a dispute with the Pakistan 
navy, suggested to be a root cause of what went terribly wrong with the 40- year Concession 
Agreement the Port of Singapore Authority signed (Tribune, The Express 2012). Apparently, the 
marine force was sitting on an area of 582 hectares of land that was otherwise needed for further 
development. In July that year, the Ports and Shipping Minister Babar Khan Ghauri went on to 
the extent of hinting to a temporary closure of the port if the Navy refused to clear the area 
(Fazl-e-Haider 2009). The navy could reach to an agreement provided they are entitled “an equal 
area somewhere else in Gwadar” (Tribune, The Express 2012). 
Iran’s success of promoting and skillfully using its ports is often cited to help Pakistani 
authorities learn from their example (Tribune, The Express 2012). Most importantly highlighted 
is the fact that a free trade zone must be the primary emphasis, much like the other more 
popular ports in the region. Rather than working on actually beneficial projects, where a 
development plan by NESPAK has been provided, resources are being wasted for useless and 
non-productive side-projects. 
An interesting finding has been highlighted that suggests that foreign investment would flow in 
for Gwadar primarily if the investors can sow what they can reap. If these investments are 
rendered irrelevant, and are depleted in developing infrastructure rather than serve business 
interests of the investor, they will not be interested in reaching down their pockets (Tribune, The 
Express 2012). 
In February 2005, the government knocked the doors of the World Bank to provide financial 
support to Gwadar in form of Loans. Though the World Bank had their warmest wishes for 
Pakistan to proceed with the development of the port city, their gesture for support wasn’t very 
promising. They instead hinted at the level of corruption in the country, and the resulting bad 
debts and unsatisfactory payback (Times 2005). The second phase of the port was to have been 
completed by 2010. 
It has been several times highlighted that the Government should cancel the agreement with the 
PSA, with statements highlighting the same by officials ranging from the Gwadar Development 
Authority director to lawyers and other distantly related officials. On the other hand, the 
government also wants to reboot the otherwise ‘paused’ project of the port by calling in other 
handlers. Lately, when President Asif Ali Zardari met with Tajikistan’s Ambassador to Pakistan, 
he also, among several other business propositions, offered the country to commence its trade 
via Gwadar port, suggesting a possibility of extended handling of the port. It probably is not too 
late for the government accepting their mishandling of the PSA deal, and they are looking out 
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for any other potential handlers to whom the port could be delegated to maintain and manage (I. 
-T. Nation 2012). This was also highlighted in earlier reports (Lee 2011). 
15.4. Hub Port: Gwadar’s Blessing and Curse 
The implications that would apply to the port, must it expand its volume to the level of handling 
transshipment of the region is a blessing and a curse at the same time. At one end, it would 
significantly boost its strategic and economic importance, and on the other, such scale would be 
not even achievable, considering the many inherent obstacles that haunt the project. Handling 
such multiple instances of loading and offloading requires a very elaborate infrastructure. 
Specifically, this would require multiple berths, whereas as of now, only three berths are 
operational, courtesy of the first phase of the project. The second phase is still an unrealized 
dream, with no sign of commencement any time soon. Not only that, the port must provide 
cutthroat response in turn-around times, shipping footprint, storage facilities and mechanical and 
technical installations, coupled with an electronic and computer automated system second to 
none. At the same time, this efficiency is expected of the rest of the complimenting 
infrastructure, i.e. the road and rail network, and the airport. Unfortunately, the latter two are 
even more predated than the port, which makes Gwadar as another wild bet for foreign 
shipment detail, and thus, their owners (the Middle Eastern, Chinese, Central Asian, Iranian, 
Afghan and Indian). The absence of a complete and optimal package and complimenting 
infrastructure for catering shipments would also be adverse, rather than useful, increasing 
operational costs, and rendering the port useless and completely unattractive to international 
clients. 
Unless utmost attention is paid to the completion of at least the planned activities at Gwadar and 
the accompanying infrastructure, the port’s status of a hub for the region would be another 
short-lived sensation. 
15.5. The Airport 
Work on Gwadar’s planned International standard airport has not even commenced, despite the 
relevant authorities having received in excess of US$ 28 Million from Oman and the Pakistan 
government itself. 
As is more than apparent from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates sensational and breathtaking 
infusion of their seaports with airports, the Gwadar Port Authority needs to ponder on how 
important it is to setup the airport, where it’s loosing value by the day. Some independent 
economists have also highlighted that Gwadar airport could at least be used as a hub for 
refueling of connecting flights, which, according to them, could cause stir some competition with 
other airports in the region (Tribune 2011). 
15.6. Alternate Uses 
Some critics have suggested alternate use of the port, given the obstacles that Gwadar is facing in 
pursuing and otherwise difficult to achieve world-class port and industrial complex. They have 
suggested facilities for catering small vessel traffic i.e. ferries and speed boats. Citing the 
examples of a few other countries in the same gulf, they have highlighted that such 
underdeveloped ports can easily serve this miniscule traffic. 
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One critic, who had been working as a Marine Captain in the Iranian Shopping Lines subsidiary, 
Valfajre-8 Company, had witnessed the profitability of such use. The company whose example 
he cited was, at the time, “the largest operator in the Gulf”. Whereas a proposition was laid 
down for the use of Gwadar as a port hosting smaller vessels, the author adds that the lack of 
government’s feedback as well as the absence of investment led to no further development 
(Hashmi 1999). 
In some cases, development has rather marched backwards than forwards. Such a disappointing 
case, though arguably due to other reasons, is witnessed in both the United Arab Emirates and 
China pulling the plugs on their Oil Refinery Investments at Gwadar (Lee 2011). 
15.7. The Road Network 
(Hashmi 1999) highlighted at least 12 years ago that roads on the Makran coast should began 
immediately, with whatever resources we have available. 
Apparently, the Makran Coastal highway was complete over 6 years ago. However, this primary 
road linking Gwadar to Karachi is now under jeopardy. The project was to be complete in all 
aspects yet the linkage to Iran and finishing of the road is still lacking. The highway is the most 
crucial road link to the port to both the western and the eastern border of Pakistan. Its 
incompletion is a serious drawback for Gwadar’s sustainable operation. Not only that: recent 
cuts and varied distribution of budget to relevant authorities in Balochistan has dispersed 
concentration on the maintenance of other roads as well. 
The National Highway Authority (NHA), the department that deals with road construction and 
maintenance of major Pakistani highways, showed serious grievances highlighting that the 
Makran Coastal Highway was delayed due serious to cuts in funds following the 2010 flood; US$ 
400 Million in 2009 were reduced to half the following year. Specifically talking of the Makran 
Costal Highway, they informed that delay was also being caused as at least US$ 22 Million were 
needed for the project, whereas the Government sanctioned only 3/4th of that requirement (I. 
K. Times 2012). It is also feared that “the provision of all of these road links is expected to cost 
several times more than the cost of the port itself” (Today 2012). 
The National Highway Authority (NHA) also highlighted law and order problems in Balochistan, 
citing the killing of a contractor at the Makran Coastal Highway (I. K. Times 2012). 
There are significant other issues involved with road transportation through Pakistani terrain, 
where roads are subject to flooding, through the Karakoram Range, landslides, and seismic 
activity (Collins 2011). Even if a road network link China’s Xinjiang province with Pakistan’s 
Gilgit-Baltistan region, the highway, whose highest point are at an altitude of 4,693 meters, 
remains closed between January and April, and is ”vulnerable to landslides, not easily usable by 
large trucks” (Jaffrelot 2011). Such hazards could seriously disrupt traffic that is en route, and if 
nature doesn’t intervene, the people themselves do, blocking roads frequently due to different 
kinds of demands. A multitude of reasons for protests often block the Indus Highway, 
disrupting traffic and trade, which could have minor to major setbacks in land trade. Records 
have indicated the road being blocked for periods lasting even 6 hours (T. News, Indus Highway 
42 
 
 
blocked against non-provision of gas 2012) and (T. News, Protesters block Indus Highway 
2010). 
Not quite outside the realm of possibility are the rare insurgent activities that are carried out over 
these roads serving other agendas (Collins 2011). 
15.8. The Rail Network 
Even if a railway network is up and running, there are several capacity constraints that are going 
to reduce the efficiency of the system. (Collins 2011) compared the nature of the terrain in 
northwestern Pakistan-China region with that of the United States; the throughput of 
locomotives on the tracks is reduced by at least 25%. Trains passing over to china would carry a 
payload of merely 2,000 tonnes because of the vertical climb. This translates to no more than 
8.75 million tonnes of cargo a year, or “175,000 barrels of oil per day”. At least 3 to 4 tracks 
would have to be laid down in parallel to address estimated trade volume. 
Back in 2005, the World Bank offered financial assistance to Pakistan Railways to extend the 
railways lines right up to Gwadar. Pakistan had plans to establish rail links with Afghanistan as 
well, and the Central Asian States, helping these land-locked countries to have better access to 
global trade via the warm waters of Pakistan. However, similar to other several plans of 
development, this support could never make it to anywhere other than the news (P. Tribune 
2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
Connecting the rail network of Pakistan with that of Central Asian countries, Iran, Afghanistan, 
and most importantly, China would be a serious advantage to trade from Gwadar. However, in 
the suggestion lies the biggest obstacle: the differences in the gauge sizes. The following are the 
gauge sizes of the tracks of the respective countries: 
 China 
> 1435 mm 
 Iran 
> 1435 mm 
 Kazakhstan 
> 1524 mm 
 Kirgizstan 
> 1524 mm 
 Pakistan 
> 1676 mm 
 Uzbekistan 
> 1524 mm 
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To adapt the rail network to a corresponding gauge-size is nothing less than impossible. Then 
there are further implications: the gauge size is not just some wild guess, but a precisely 
calculated measurement of all factors including terrain type, typical load and type of carriage. A 
third or fourth gauge could be installed, suggesting serious expenditure – an area in which 
Pakistan Railways (PR), the rail network department of the country, least excels. 
News in 2011 of the PR dismissing all cargo cars, along with 11 engines and 115 passenger trains 
couldn’t be any less reassuring. Only 15% of 540 locomotives were functional, along with less 
than half of 68 power couches, and no air-conditioned couches running any more on the tracks 
(Daily 2011). In a crisis as such as these, further development to support Gwadar would be last 
thing on anyone’s mind. 
Despite a few bailout attempts, the department still shut down trains – even the good ones. 
What is more interesting to note is that deficits would rather increase even more rapidly if the 
freight trains also cease movement – the segment that make a third of the total revenues. The 
most common understanding, one on a national level for that matter, is none other than 
corruption, bringing down the departments funds to run only a third of the trains they have. An 
insider highlighted that at the millennium, the department possessed 502 functional engines; a 
decade later, less than 1/5th are available (I. R. Today 2011). 
With significant delays on major routes and closure on smaller, less important routes (T. News, 
Railways considering to get engines on rent from India 2011) the railways would do more 
damage than good to the Gwadar port project. The Railways department is finding it difficult to 
maintain what it already has for now, as it is; laying more multi-billion dollar railway links is an 
entirely another ballgame. 
15.9. Corruption 
When the government approached the World Bank for Loans for development of Gwadar Port, 
they were instead faced criticism on the non-payments of the existing loans. The government 
however, argued that they had resolved corruption on the high level (Times 2005). Contrary to 
the government’s stance, however, corruption has multiplied tenfold. In the last four years alone, 
figures of corruption and tax evasion have reached as high as US$ 94 Billion (Abbasi 2012), a 
figure that would doesn’t move a hair on a high-ranking government official, but brings shivers 
to the common person. 
Sadly, Pakistan already ranks at the bottom of the Corruption Index list for 2011. Ranking at 134 
out of 180 countries with an index of 2.5 (compared to New Zealand, which is at No. 1 with an 
index of 9.5), suggests that there has been no significant improvement in justice or national 
interests. 
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Figure XII: Corruption Scale Index 2011 – Transparency International14 
Data Source: The Guardian News and Media Limited 
15.10. Balochistan 
Balochistan has always been haunted by the feudalism and control of tribal leaders in the area. 
There hasn’t been any significant development there in years. It couldn’t be any worse when 
neither the locals nor their leaders have the least bit of interest in the port project. The locals 
view it as an intrusion in their culture; the tribal lords see a serious threat to their monopolistic 
hold of the area. The Pakistani government has been criticized one too many times of using 
‘alternate methods’ to keep the province intact with the rest of the country (Masood 2004). 
One possible explanation for the Baloch having been overlooked could be the population of the 
province despite it being largest in size; six million people compared to the other 167 million15 
would obviously lack in presence, vocalization, and eventually, attention. 
Hidden support of the United States for Balochistan’s independence has not been undermined 
either, which would help weaken the federal system and forfeit Pakistan of an important asset to 
the extent of stirring up the same independence movement in Iranian Balochistan (Masood 
2004). The Baloch Conference of North America in a meeting held a year ago even came up with 
a “declaration describing the horrors of the Pakistani occupation”, apart from declaring Pakistan 
useless in the War on Terror, citing that they rather support terrorist elements (Lee 2011). 
Balochistan has had continues conflicts and reservations with the rest of the country for decades 
now. The worst form of it is the banned terrorist organization that goes by the name of the 
Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), active in both the Pakistani and Iranian Balochistan, with 
leaders including tribal leaders that are successors to the Bugti clan. The organization that carries 
out terrorist activities and operates in guerilla warfare manner. Comments on the motives or 
ideology of the organization would not be just, and are irrelevant to this particular study. 
                                            
14 Data for figure obtained from the Guardian /Transparency International. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/dec/01/corruption-index-2011-transparency-international. A few countries out the total of 
180 for whom the data is available have been removed from the graph to make it legible for the reader’s understanding. However, no 
changes to the integrity or conclusion of the data or values occurred by doing so. 
15 Population of Pakistan is around 173,590,000 (The World Bank 2012). 
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Nevertheless, the actions and behavior of the group has a detrimental effect to the sovereignty of 
the country as a whole. 
In February 2011, Selig S. Harrison made recommendations to the United States, no less 
controversial for any Pakistani citizen. He suggested that the US stance should be to support 
anti-Islamist resources along southern Pakistan. While hinting that the support should be for Sufi 
groups in Sindh, the whole Baloch population should be supported by the US. According to him, 
the Baloch are awaiting independence from Pakistan (Harrison 2011). An independent 
Balochistan would serve as a valuable asset for Uncle Sam’s strategic control over the nearby 
geographic region. 
Balochistan is also a major victim of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), as most 
usually, repercussions of any actions or happenings there influence both the NWFP and 
Balochistan province. The military operations against terrorism in the Waziristan agencies and 
the infamous US Drone Attacks are a common discussion in newspapers and economists alike, 
having serious implications for the locals. 
Gwadar’s international image and business interests are seriously damaged with the law and 
order, safety and integrity situation in Balochistan. 
Initial talks of the development of Gwadar immediately followed with the Balochistan 
government less interested in foreign intervention and more in favor of local management and 
control. An obvious case is of Chief Minister Nawab Muhammad Aslam Raisani – chairperson 
of the Board of Directors of Gwadar Port – who, without wasting any time, showed his 
concerns of Chinese management over local consideration (Lee 2011). Cries of the Baloch 
people for having labor and jobs outsource instead (News 2008) were obvious when the first 
container docked at the port, and the Chief Minister witnessed outsourcing of labor (D. News 
2008). 
Rather than welcoming foreigners to help with development – the Chinese in this specific 
context, the Baloch are instead looking for avenues to expel them from the region, fearing it as 
yet another one of the countless attacks to their sovereignty. Peter Lee cited columnist Robert 
Kaplan (Lee 2011) having interviewed a Baloch who threatened that any further intervention in 
the area would be met with harsh consequences, completely dispelling the ‘Dubai-like’ 
development (Hassan 2005) that is intended by the Federal Government and the Chinese 
counterparts. It seems like the Baloch are neither bothered nor interested in any economic 
facelift, solely wanting to maintain the status quo. 
15.11. Foreign Influence 
There have been instances of reports falling through that suggest that there are other national 
interests serving against the interest of Gwadar or any other development in Balochistan. 
India and Russia are believed to be involved, directly or indirectly, in supporting the Baloch 
Liberation Army, with India so much as having set up at least nine (9) training camps along the 
border of Afghanistan. The claims further highlight that India, and the United Arab Emirates 
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(probably in the wake of the Gwadar port project) “were funding and arming the Baloch”. Even 
Russia is believed to be involved (Imtiaz 2010). 
Even the then-president Musharraf requested the United States in 2007 to “intervene on the 
‘deliberate’ attempt of Kabul and New Delhi to destabilize Balochistan” citing he had proof of 
Indian and afghan support for Baloch extremists, some even operating in Afghanistan (Imtiaz 
2010). 
 
 
15.12. China’s Alternate Stance 
15.12.1. Feasibility Issues 
Even though China and Pakistan’s trade alliance is growing at a good pace, realizing the true 
potential from the Gwadar port may not be the most economical for the Asian giant. 
Transporting oil and goods via its existing maritime routes would still be cheaper and safer for 
China, as is clearly evident in the following illustration (Collins 2011): 
 
Figure XIII: Transportation Costs for Moving Oil from the Persian Gulf 
(via Chongqing, China vs. via Gwadar Port)16 
                                            
16 Figure obtained from http://www.chinasignpost.com/2010/12/still-a-pipedream-a-pakistan-to-china-rail-corridor-is-not-a-substitute-for-
maritime-transport/. 
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Source: BNSF Railway, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, NBS, ND Petroleum Council, China SignPost 
 
If China is to use the railroad link through Pakistan’s Khunjerab Pass, all the way from Gwadar 
to Karachi to Peshawar, right up to Xinjiang, a vertical climb of at least 15,000 feet may cost 
tenfold than the maritime counterpart China already uses.  (Collins 2011) cite the example of the 
2,000 km-long Qingzang railway to Lhasa, Tibet, the cost of which arrived at US$ 1.85 million 
per km. A rail line connecting Pakistan with China is even a bigger, more expensive challenge, 
with at least 3,000 kilometers of track to be laid down, costing up to US$ 30 million per 
kilometer at the highest points (Jaffrelot 2011). Calculation demonstrate it would cost China US$ 
2.22 per barrel to haul oil in from Ras al-Tanura through a predominantly sea-based route all the 
way through the Straits of Hormuz, to the tip of India, Malaysia, Indonesia right up to Taiwan. 
The same load routed through Gwadar would cost US$ 8 to US$ 12, with costs going even 
beyond for the more eastern destinations within China. The bottom-line would be similar for 
other commercial shippers, serving an economic disadvantage for all who would want to move 
through Gwadar (Collins 2011). 
China also views the offer of being handed-over the port of Gwadar as a costly favor to 
Pakistan, apparently being asked to undo the damage the done by the PSA, no thanks to the 
Pakistani government’s not-so-clever decision-making. The overall benefits of the port to China 
are finding trouble justifying themselves compared to the financial expenditures, hardships, 
sacrifices and the compromises the superpower may have to make (Lee 2011). 
15.12.2. Security and Safety Issues 
After the first case of three (3) Chinese engineers in May 2004 in Gwadar (Lee 2011), many 
Chinese nationals have been attacked, kidnapped and killed in the country, with more threats 
having followed thereafter. Situations put Chinese personnel’s lives in jeopardy, and at the same 
time, embarrass the Asian giant, as was the case of 11 Chinese helicopter technicians in transit a 
1,000 kilometers from Gwadar during an attack terrorist attack and US drone and military 
counterattack (Lee 2011). 
15.12.3. Military Implications 
It is not quite out of context that Chinese would have wanted to have Gwadar not only as an 
economic hub, but also as a potential control tower or base to have a better view off the waters 
of southern Pakistan. 
However, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Ahmed Mukhtar spilled the beans in 2011 during a visit to 
China by extending them an invitation to build and maintain a naval base at Gwadar (Reuters 
2011). Ammad Hassan in his dissertation (Hassan 2005) that is a major inspiration to this paper, 
could not have been clearer in strongly emphasizing that no suggestions, implications or 
references be made to China for any military expedition at Gwadar – at the least, not in public. 
These instructions are at least five years old, seeming like the Pakistani authorities stayed quiet 
for years only to wait one senior defense official to whistle blow his own country’s game plan 
half a decade later. The reaction was met with a severe backlash and denial by Chinese 
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authorities of any military-related interests at Gwadar or the nearby areas (G. Times 2011), 
(Dasgupta 2011). China’s reactions were justified, considering such fragile international 
implications of the offer, the least favorable of them all being Osama Bin Laden’s discovery and 
killing in Pakistan itself hardly two weeks earlier. China could not have been more concerned, 
and surely, this had put it in a tight spot, with the world suspecting evermore the superpower’s 
affection for a country that is apparently ‘Al-Qaeda’s international safe house’. Equally 
discouraging was a Taliban attack on the Mehran Naval Base in Karachi that happened over the 
same week as Defense Minister’s invitation - a few hundred kilometers from Gwadar. Whereas 
China was to emphasize on discouraging US military intervention in favor of economic and trade 
uprising, the naval base theory pushed the Asian dragon back in its lair (Lee 2011). 
15.13.Halt in Investment and Support 
A report in Business Recorder cited by Syed Fazl-e-Haider highlighted China informing Pakistan 
that its multi-billion dollar coastal oil refinery project along with a bigger Petrochemical City 
project at Gwadar had been written off their financial plans, contrary to previous agreements. 
The decision followed, China added, the lack of parallel infrastructure development at the city. A 
catalyst could have been a similar decision by the United Arab Emirates six-months ago. 
International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC) of Abu-Dhabi in pursuit of building U$ 5 
billion Khalifa Coastal Refinery (KCR), announced in 2007. However, by 2009, they had done 
only one thing: changed the planned location to Hub in Balochistan – far away from Gwadar. 
Even afterwards, no work commenced in connection with the refinery, to the extent of the 
Pakistani government considering building a refinery elsewhere with the collaboration of another 
foreign company. The delay also put pressure on companies already operating refineries in the 
country to increase their capacity (Fazl-e-Haider 2009). 
The previously planned U$ 12.5 billion Mega-Oil project in Gwadar has therefore been 
compromised. Furthermore, this rings bells on China’s similar considerations, of oil and gas 
pipelines and transportation of the same through Pakistani terrain (Fazl-e-Haider 2009). 
(Lee 2011) cited an Indian source suggesting that “Gwadar is a failed commercial port – built 
with over US$ 200 Million in unenthusiastic Chinese aid – in the middle of a wilderness that 
nobody visits”, an very discomforting opinion of a project that has discouraging implications. 
Few evidences do point in that direction, however, since lately, much work and development 
regarding the port has indeed been at a pause. 
15.14.India’s Role 
China is to Gwadar, as India is to Chabahar. Interestingly enough, a possible clash of civilizations 
could occur, however by the fact that India is also working on the assistance of a port project – 
none other than Iran’s Port of Chabahar, hardly 70 km away from Gwadar. A 213-kilometer 
Zaranj-Dilaram road in Afghanistan’s Nimroz province is ready, with the Chabahar-Milak-
Zaranj-Dilaram route in progress, along with India’s support for Chabahar-Milak railroad 
(Jaffrelot 2011). 
India has hinted its fear of Pakistan’s dominance in the Strait of Hormuz, must Gwadar be fully 
operational, a possible threat to Indian tankers (S. M. Reuters 2011). India even highlighted that 
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Chinese presence in the Arabian Sea would allow it to monitor Indian and US naval movements 
or any other mutual maritime activities (Jaffrelot 2011), though the Indian Navy’s Rear Admiral 
added that a win-win strategy that could serve both countries could be a thriving and reassuring 
modus operandi (India 2008). 
Also interesting to note is (Jaffrelot 2011) citing Robert Kaplan that Indians’ response to Gwadar 
is another “US$ $8 billion naval base at Karwar, south of Goa on India’s Arabian coast, the first 
phase of which opened in 2005”. 
Peter Lee has interpreted Pakistani scholar Hami Yusuf citing that the only way to ensure South 
Asian peace and prosperity is by normalizing relations between Pakistan and India. In a recent 
poll, Pakistanis regard India as a bigger threat (53%) than the Taliban (23%), (Lee 2011), 
necessitating the Pakistani people to make peace with their neighbor, must they have a better and 
welcoming economic position and an improved international integrity and image. 
15.15.The US Agenda 
The United States has mostly been a silent spectator to the Gwadar project and the Balochistan 
situation on the whole, rarely assisting military operations, those too, that have more intrinsic 
value to their interests than the interests of Pakistan. It is not as if Pakistan didn’t already ask the 
United States for their help first: the Nixon Administration didn’t feel the need to undertake the 
development of Gwadar, or a naval base there (Jaffrelot 2011), so decades later, Pakistan asked 
China instead. 
A few strategists have proposed an Independent Balochistan, suggesting that national 
sovereignty or economic prosperity of the people of Pakistan is not really their concern; the US 
only wants eradication of terrorism in the region – with or without Pakistan, doesn’t really 
matter. The same is what they would say of the fate of the economy, harmony, prosperity, or 
even the existence of a Pakistan (Lee 2011); such indifference is a clear conflict of national 
interests. 
It is quite possible that like other hidden foreign support to anti-Pakistani elements, the US 
contributes its equal share, on one hand to curb terrorism, and on the other that’s under the 
table, to maintain a destabilized administration in the country. In the end, the US would be more 
in favor in an independent Balochistan than against it, due to its resources as well as prime access 
to Straits of Hormuz (Lee 2011). 
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16. FINDINGS 
Is Gwadar an economic haven for Balochistan and Pakistan? The answer is: no, not yet. 
Commenced in 2002 and apparently complete by 2008, it has been at least half a decade since the 
port’s existence. Gwadar has followed the financing methodology that theories suggest, and 
indeed, Foreign Direct Investment has been attracted – most of it from China - yet the port is 
still in infancy, almost completely in terms of trade volume. What should have been a fourth 
generation port, is finding it hard to operate even as a first generation one. 
Gwadar port is currently in no position to follow Verhoeven’s three-dimensional fourth 
generation port concept, since it lacks the primary components of being able to be assessed on 
that scale. There is an absence of value added services, and port operators and carriers have not 
been able to establish power or resulting business at the port, which also depicts a lack of 
theoretical application of strategies. 
The Port of Jebel Ali and Port Zayed may be inspirational examples, but their location at the 
rich, tourist, capital-intensive and almost completely developed Abu-Dhabi and Dubai17 makes 
them very different scenarios. Here at Gwadar, there is hardly any population, tourist attractions, 
residential locations or other international-level amenities. 
Pakistan unfortunately suffers from lack of resources as well as technical and management 
capabilities; these curses often invite foreign assistance to handle situations, be it a company as 
huge as the nation’s telephone carrier18, or a backward area with rural population. Gwadar is 
another example where the country looked for outside help to nurture, develop and nurse the 
port. More so, the 40-year lease agreement signed with the PSA is not going to be an easy 
reversal19, and is the primary obstacle in the port’s halt of business activities. 
The government has orchestrated an ‘artificial demand’ at the port. Where the PSA has been 
sighted to not have lived up to its commitments, the government couldn’t have been less 
supportive. Routing cargo that is otherwise destined for Karachi’s ports is a strategy that is 
neither economic nor sane by any means. On top of that, the government heavily subsidizes the 
cargo processed at Gwadar. 
The miscalculation occurred by the Government’s Gwadar Development Authority (GDA) of 
handing over the rights of the port to Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) which, in time, has 
                                            
17 Given Abu Dhabi and Dubai’s state-of-the-art infrastructures, airport, shopping malls, tourist attractions, numerous residential 
developments, financial and economic centers and the proximity of all these to the ports. 
18 A significant shareholding (26%) of PTCL was sold to United Arab Emirates’s Etisalat (B. News 2005), apparently a move of 
privatization, expected to improve economic development and company performance. 
19 The case has been pending for the last 4 years. 
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proven not to be up to the mark. Despite the fact that port authorities are the victim to blame 
for lack of performance of the port, as theories suggest, most of the ports in competition with 
Gwadar discussed here in this paper are being managed by the local port authorities20, helping 
the countries overcome any territorial or operational control issues. Where privatization of ports 
in contemporary periods has garnered success and profitability for most modern ports, for 
Gwadar, the concept has worked adversely. It has established a lack of control, dilution of 
common and national interests, and conflict amongst stakeholders. 
Whereas containerized trade is the modern standard, Gwadar port has witnessed ignorable traffic 
of containers. This is also contrary to standard trade practices, and implies lack of foresight of 
the operators and handlers of the port.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
20 As highlighted in the competing ports of Oman, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Iran, all of who have respective local 
port authorities to manage the ports. 
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17. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As the port has been cited to hardly been moving any tonnage (Ahmed 2012), it is strongly 
recommended that the government take good control over a national asset as potent and 
important as Gwadar. ‘Purchasing’ Gwadar back from Oman was an important move and was 
necessary for national security; keeping it in an even better condition and optimally exploiting its 
potential is equally important. However, particular care should be taken when taking such steps, 
keeping an eagle’s eye on national interests as well national security. 
The government should learn from these mistakes and create finely crafted business and 
technical propositions for future endeavors of Gwadar. A wiser business sense should be used to 
deal with the lack of popularity of the port. Spoon-feeding Gwadar at this stage of infancy would 
never let it grow in the long haul and be self-sufficient; the bailout is more of a slow poising. It is 
further emphasized that domestic cargo may continue to be handled at the Karachi ports, and 
only transshipments be handled at Gwadar. 
Much of the current trade through the port is irrelevant and makes no sense. With upcoming oil, 
gas and mineral developments in Balochistan as well as its natural tendency to deal in the same21, 
is imperative that Gwadar also focus in the same direction. 
Gwadar must focus primarily on transshipments – the civic centers and other lifestyle amnesties 
would not serve well in the middle of a desert that is otherwise out of reach and out of sight (Lee 
2011). Suggestions have also been made to cater smaller vessels, as in the successful case of Iran 
(Hashmi 1999). These would provide both promotion and trade. Additionally, having the 
infrastructure of a fourth generation port is important, but in order to sustain port operations 
and profitability, it is also important to relate them strongly with each other. 
Military elements must be completely kept out of the Gwadar equation. Already the country is 
under strict surveillance and a prime suspect in most of the terrorist activities that take place the 
world over. It is strongly advisable to keep all weapons holstered at any table discussions. 
Gwadar’s strategic position can be exploited in that direction, but that must be pondered upon 
only in times of war.  
Pakistan should also create harmony with neighboring economies like India and Afghanistan. 
Mutual benefits should be put before primitive, territorial, conflicted thinking. With gas-pipelines 
in development with these economies, bilateral trade and transshipments would help reiterate the 
need for Gwadar, which would probably follow with support. The three-dimensional fourth 
generation port concept also emphasizes on an optimal co-existence, with the participants 
working on a win-win strategy serving their common interests. Stakeholders of Gwadar port 
should inquire into common objectives, and, putting cultural or ideological differences aside, aim 
to sustain themselves in the ever-shrinking global business atmosphere. 
                                            
21 Balochistan is a dry, barren province with proven mineral reserves. Additionally, most development there has been in oil refineries, 
mineral exploration, and most trade and processing would be of these products. 
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18. CONCLUSION 
Gwadar is not yet an economic haven for Balochistan or Pakistan. 
The port is not yet completely developed in actual terms, yet it 
still is one of the major economic projects in Balochistan in 
decades. The port could cater transshipments and play an 
important role as a hub port in the energy corridor of the region. 
It could also give Balochistan a chance to replenish on lost 
identity and economy, and whereas it could be a military outpost 
for Pakistan, this is strongly discouraged. 
Certain initial strategies stay true to theoretical implementations 
following the success of other major contemporary ports. 
However, it has failed to sustain itself in the long-term amidst the 
challenging globalized trade atmosphere. The project has had 
several issues – those within stakeholder’s control, and those 
beyond it. It has been half a decade since Gwadar was made 
operational whereas investments in the port, its infrastructure, 
and supporting development zones that reached at least half a 
billion dollar mark are yet to witness any return. Multibillion-
dollar commitments and plans have been washed out; others 
having been delayed indefinitely. 
The need of the hour is that the Pakistani government and Baloch 
people join hands to make this avenue attractive once again, so 
that investments that were already in place could be realized, and 
newer attractions be created. The cases of successful ports in the 
not-too-distant past serve as standards and benchmarks, and the 
reasons for their success, and the relevant theoretical practices 
must be revisited.  
The Pakistani government must play its due role to bring Gwadar 
to bear the fruits of what was anticipated. This also requires 
Pakistan to look at the bigger picture, which serves economic, 
cultural and profitable interests of the region, rather than 
individual and military ones. 
All stakeholders, in their own capacity, should devise efficient, 
economic and intelligent ways to benefit from the port. 
Eventually, Gwadar could pay off many nations and countries. 
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